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This paper explores the extent to which analogies can be drawn between unsustainable develop-
ment and a Ponzi scheme. A Ponzi scheme is a type of fraudulent investment strategy and an 
extreme form of market failure caused by ill-informed decisions based on questionable criteria; 
the driving force is individual and collective deception and self-deception. Unsustainable develop-
ment is possible because economic activities are frequently distanced, spatially and temporally, 
from their associated environmental impacts. As in a classic Ponzi scheme, this creates a separa-
tion between enjoyment of benefits and the disbenefit in the form of eventual unsustainability; the 
deception relates to disregard for, or concealment of, disbenefits and their inequitable incidence. 
Analogies with Ponzi schemes can be perceived or implied in relation to resource depletion, 
environ mental degradation or unsustainable living standards, and also when questions are 
raised concerning the justification of interventions ostensibly to promote sustainability. Most 
 environmental concerns, particularly with medium- and long-term impacts, have the potential to 
 generate such perceptions: examples include climate change, nuclear waste, hazardous wastes, 
toxic substances, soil degradation, declining biodiversity, and fish stock depletion.
Perspectives are influenced by the definition and scope of sustainability, the nature of techno-
logical change, time frames and time inconsistency, and concepts of equity. These factors  reflect 
underlying tensions between the pursuit of sustainability and the free play of market forces, 
exacerbated by a dissonance between individual and collective rationality. The dilemmas are 
 compounded by uncertainty, exacerbated by the inherent unpredictability of discontinuities. Con-
sciousness, knowledge and awareness differ both conceptually and in degree, such that Ponzi-ism 
may even be inadvertent. The ultimate question then is what is known – when, by whom and in 
what way? The remedies lie in informed decision making, consensus on the key issues of equity 
and efficiency, and an explicit recognition of environmental property rights.
Keywords: Ponzi Scheme, Deception, Sustainable development, Environmental 
impacts, Inter-generational equity, Uncertainty
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1. PONZI SCHEMES:  
INDIVIDUaL aND COLLECTIVE DECEPTION 
aND SELF DECEPTION
“Environmental despoliation may… be conceived as kind of 
global Ponzi scheme, the early investors doing well, the later 
ones losing everything.” (Paulos,1996, p.96).
A Ponzi scheme is a type of fraudulent investment  strategy. 
Typically fraudsters promise very high returns, and use 
 money from new recruits to the scheme to pay off early-stage 
 investors, until the scheme gets so big that the inlow of new 
 money is insuficient; at which point the scheme collapses 
amid losses and recriminations (Sander, 2009, p.2). The 
fraud is often assisted by intermediaries who are reckless 
and negligent, rather than dishonest, and who guide inves-
tors towards the scheme. The beneiciaries are either well-
informed and dishonest (the scheme promoters), wilfully 
and negligently ill-informed (intermediaries), or ill-informed 
but fortunate (investors who withdraw their funds before the 
 collapse). The victims, those left with worthless investments, 
are both ill-informed and unlucky.
This is in essence a form of market failure, characterised 
by extreme asymmetry of information. Investors are actively 
 ill-informed: not only do the scheme promoters mislead and 
lie to them, but there is also an element of complicity on the 
part of those who fail properly to scrutinise the misinforma-
tion. Thus investors’ judgement is distorted by a suspension 
of the disbelief that would otherwise caution them against 
opaque accounting and promises of implausibly high returns. 
In short, the victims believe what they want to believe.
A further essential precondition for the operation of a Ponzi 
scheme is a separation between the initial activity (the 
 early  investments) and the eventual outcome (the scheme’s 
 collapse). The separation is always temporal, but it might 
also be geographical and social. The victims suffer the 
 consequences of the earlier action of the beneiciaries; vic-
tims’ inability to detect the fraudulent nature of the scheme 
can be exacerbated by distance or by unfamiliarity with the 
nature of apparently sophisticated investment plans. 
If sustainable development is a well-informed, rational and 
responsible approach to investing in society’s future, then a 
development path without these features may be character-
ised as unsustainable.
In contrasting sustainability and unsustainability  analogies 
can be drawn with the relationship between an honest in-
vestment and a Ponzi scheme. Unsustainable development 
is  driven by individual and collective deception and self- 
deception.  Economic activities are frequently distanced, 
 spatially and temporally, from their associated  environmental 
impacts. As in a classic Ponzi scheme, this creates a sepa-
ration between enjoyment of beneits and the disbeneit in 
the form of  eventual unsustainability; the deception relates 
to disregard for, or concealment of, disbeneits and their 
 inequitable incidence.
Paulos (1996, p.96) identiies the strong element of self- 
deception, and calls for action to “keep us from being our own 
Ponzis”. This begs a question: who are the “us”? The answer 
in general is anyone who beneits from economic activity that 
fails fully to cover its associated environmental costs, and 
who then suffers, inancially or otherwise, from the ensuing 
 environmental damage. Deined in this way, virtually the entire 
global population can be characterised as living, consciously 
or otherwise, in conditions created by fraud. However, culpa-
bility, and its degree, depends upon the incidence of economic 
activity and environmental damage.
While not necessarily involving explicit deception,  entitlements 
over environmental capacity can have parallels with a Ponzi 
scheme. This is seen in the recognition of so-called grand-
father rights, whereby existing usage is allowed to continue, 
effectively conferring a property right that can then be sold to 
newcomers. Although it can be seen as less equitable than the 
alternative procedure of auctioning the rights, grandfathering 
can be easier politically because it buys off opposition from 
established interest groups. Whether these property rights 
should be recognised is a question that tends to be obscured, 
with an implicit element of deception. Grandfathering on 
a global scale may be inferred from the perpetuation of ex-
treme imbalances in the use of environmental resources: for 
instance does the United States have an entitlement to a level 
of per capita energy consumption approximately 16 times that 
of India?
Acknowledgement of the problem in general terms is often 
combined with speciic denial of responsibility. The implicit 
line is that others may be Ponzis but we are on the whole 
victims. This is illustrated by “a senior oficial in the [Indian] 
foreign ministry [who] characterises America’s line as ‘Guys 
with gross obesity telling guys just emerging from emacia-
tion to go on an emergency diet’… India defends [its increased 
greenhouse gas emissions] on moral grounds: its people have 
the same right to wealth as anyone. Indeed, given their spe-
cial vulnerability to climate problems, they have a particularly 
 urgent need for economic development. After all, a factory 
worker with an air-conditioner will feel global warming less 
than a subsistence farmer will [sic]” (The Economist, 2008, 
p.30). While America may have more obesity than  India, the 
solution to emaciation is not for wealthier people in  India 
to join the ranks of the obese – just as if a Ponzi scheme is 
 perpetrated by erstwhile victims, that does not make it a 
 legitimate investment.
The scope for Ponzi-ism is enhanced where environmental 
property rights are ill-deined. The phenomenon is illustrat-
ed by the often perverse results of programmes designed to 
help potential victims, which are distorted by rent- seeking 
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 behaviour taking advantage of a lack of transparency in 
 programme management and with respect to property rights. 
The outcome can be an increase in the burden of environ-
mental damage borne by the intended beneiciaries. For-
instance, the Indian Drought-Prone Areas Programme (DPAP) 
has  provided assistance for districts “with an abundance of 
rainfall – but where one section, the poor, can suffer acute 
drought”. This has led to a misallocation of water  resources: 
“around 73 percent of sugar cane produced in the state [of 
Maharastra] is grown in DPAP blocks! And sugar cane is 
the most water-intensive crop you can get” (Sainath, 1996, 
p.319). A situation where “about two percent of farmers in the 
state use around 70 percent of [irrigation water]” leads to “an 
agri cultural drought, even where there is no meteorological 
drought. That is, you can have adequate rainfall and still have 
crop failure” (Sainath, 1996, p.320). If the poor had access to 
water as a property right, it might be more effectively and 
 equitably  managed. 
A quite different perspective is offered by Lomborg, who 
 perceives an inherent bias towards negativity in perceptions 
of the quality of the environment, such that “the stream of in-
formation we receive is inherently lopsided”. He sees  dificulty 
in compensating for this bias because “historically and per-
haps biologically we are disposed to welcome negative news” 
( Lomborg, 2001, p.42). The predisposition towards negativity 
is certainly not manifested in Ponzi scheme investors, who 
tend to disregard bad news in a willing suspension of disbelief 
when offered returns that are literally too good to be true.
Nevertheless, “we need to confront our myth of the  economy 
undercutting the environment” (Lomborg, 2001, p.32). The in-
ference is that “we” are engaged in self-deception. In  Lomborg’s 
view this deception is reinforced by environmentalists who 
preach “the litany of our ever deteriorating environment” 
( Lomborg, 2001, p.3), which suggests that, whatever their moti-
vations, the “litanists” might be some species of Ponzi. 
On the other hand, the “litanists” could claim that there is 
an element of Ponzi-ism in holding out the prospect of ever-
increasing prosperity while downplaying environmental risks. 
Lomborg presents a massive assemblage of environmental 
“facts”; but it must be recognised that change is constant, and 
new challenges are always in prospect (see below; for further 
discussion of Lomborg’s perspective see Barrass, 2003).
2. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT  
aND ENVIRONMENTaL IMPaCTS
A Ponzi scheme carries the certainty of its own demise. 
 Economic development, depending upon its sustainability, has 
the potential for its own destruction. Sachs (2009, pp.80-81) 
identiies a “paradox of enrichment”, whereby “ humanity’s  vital 
success in appropriating the Earth’s riches could also prove 
to be its downfall”, leading from “the transitory  successes of 
 industrialization to the point of ecological collapse”.
The market economy has similarities with evolutionary 
 biology in which short-term success can lead to a long-term 
dead end. Competition is analogous with the intra-species 
“arms race” (Dawkins, 2009, p.383): although “natural selec-
tion can drive a population to extinction… [it] will still favour 
the most competitive individuals right up to the moment when 
the last one dies.” (Dawkins, 2009, p.390). Markets typically 
exhibit impatience, discounting the future at the expense of 
long term survival: for instance slow growing species can be 
harvested unsustainably, resulting in a loss of biodiversity 
(Sachs, 2009, pp. 39-41).
Processes of change may be abrupt or gradual, and each car-
ries potential threats. Extremely complex processes can have 
sudden dramatic impacts, produced by an interaction of caus-
ative factors. Thus “when a natural system is characterized by 
thresholds combined with positive feedbacks, it is also likely 
to be characterized by abrupt changes [resulting from] a chain 
reaction of positive feedbacks” (Sachs, 2009, p.79). Human ac-
tions without regard to, or in ignorance of, the pressures that 
are generated on ecological systems can lead to “severe and 
unanticipated consequences” (Sachs, 2009, p.79). 
3. EXaMPLES OF SPaTIaL  
aND TEMPORaL DISSONaNCE
A Ponzi scheme requires separation between beneits to per-
petrators and impacts on victims. Similarly, unsustainable 
development can be a consequence of the uneven spatial and 
temporal incidence of economic development and environmen-
tal impacts. Most environmental impacts, particularly those 
with an extended time frame, have the potential to  generate a 
Ponzi-like separation of beneits and ultimate costs: examples 
include climate change, radioactive waste management, haz-
ardous wastes, the use of toxic substances, soil  degradation, 
declining biodiversity, and ish stock depletion.
One instance is graphically described by Jared Diamond 
as follows: “despite Montanans’ long-standing embrace of 
 mining… some… now say in retrospect when we compare 
the multi-billion dollar mine clean-up costs borne by us tax-
payers with Montana’s own meagre past earnings from its 
mines… we realize that Montana would have been better off 
in the long run if it had never mined copper at all” (Diamond, 
2005, p.38). The extraction of beneits leaving eventual en-
vironmental damage costs to others has a strong element 
of Ponzi-ism: “until 1971, mining companies in Montana 
on closing down a mine just left it… because the state of 
 Montana had no law requiring companies to clean up after 
mine closures.” (Diamond, 2005, p.428).
4. STRONG aND WEaK SUSTaINaBILITY
The fraud inherent in a Ponzi scheme lies in the victims’ de-
privation of an entitlement that they had been promised. In 
the context of sustainability this raises a question as to what 
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precisely is involved in a commitment to sustainable devel-
opment; and, conversely, what is the nature of any breach of 
trust if a development path proves to be unsustainable.
While there may be a wide agreement that economic activ-
ity should be sustainable, the nature of sustainability is often 
ill-deined. There are two deinitions of sustainability, strong 
and weak, and in practice the commitment would seem to 
lie somewhere in a range between these extremes, perhaps 
veering towards the weak version.
The difference between strong and weak sustainability lies in 
the distinction between natural and man-made capital and the 
degree of substitutability between them. Strong sustainabil-
ity may be deined as requiring maintenance of the aggregate 
and the natural capital stock, or preservation of the physical 
stock of critical natural capital, that is capital that cannot be 
substituted by man-made capital (Neumayer, 1999, p.27). 
Weak sustainability has less stringent pre-conditions, requir-
ing only that the value of the aggregate stock be maintained; 
this implies substitutability between natural and man-made 
capital (Neumayer, 1999, p.23).
In practice this means that the use of energy from fossil 
 fuels and nuclear power drives the economic growth that 
can  provide resources for future generations to combat the 
effects of climate change and manage the legacy of nuclear 
wastes. It can even be consistent with strong sustainability if 
the gains from conventional energy production are invested in 
development of renewable energy (Neumayer, 1999, p.27). If 
this does not happen, future generations will have been given 
false promises, like the victims of Ponzi schemes. 
Unsustainability can be manifested in various ways:
1 Depletion of environmental resources and  
assimilative capacity. 
2 A legacy of environmental degradation that must  
be managed. 
3 Living standards are unsustainable, and will be  
lower in the future.
Of these, 3 is clearly a case of unsustainable development. 
Both 1 and 2 could be consistent with weak sustainability, 
 provided that there is suficient investment to make provision 
for adaptive and remedial measures. Even strong sustainabi-
lity might be accommodated, but only if there is no effect on 
critical natural capital.
The implication of these insights is that sustainability is 
achieved by indirect targeting. There is an analogy with rocket 
science, whereby spacecraft make use of gravitational forces 
in following an elliptical course. This concept of a sustain-
ability trajectory is illustrated by the conclusions drawn from 
 Nordhaus’ Dynamic Integrated Model of Climate and the 
 Economy (DICE), that “little should be done to reduce carbon 
emissions in the near future; that controls on carbon should be 
put into effect in an increasing, but gradual manner,  starting 
several decades from now… that it would be more equitable 
(and eficient) to invest in physical and human capital now, 
so as to build up the productive base of economies (includ-
ing, especially, poor countries), and divert funds to meet the 
 problems of climate change at a later year” (Dasgupta, p.5).
However, it is necessary to ensure that the productive 
 investment is of the right sort, and does not exacerbate the 
problem. The inherent dificulties have been described as 
 follows: “both “weak” and “strong” criteria… imply a central-
ized decision-making process and a decision-making pro-
cess and a decision maker who decides on behalf of “society” 
among alternative programs and plans. But the real world is 
not at all like that. In reality, virtually all economic decisions 
are decentralized among many much narrower interests… 
Even with the best intentions as regards future generations 
and planetary welfare, most decision-makers will optimize 
within a much narrower context” (Ayres et al., 1998, pp.11-12).
The problems may be particularly acute, as in the case of 
 climate change, where a coordinated response is required in 
the face of a global threat. At the 2009 Copenhagen Climate 
Change Summit, the G77 developing countries group called for 
a UN body “with powers to direct a worldwide transition away 
from a high-carbon economy” (Jha, 2009). The dificulty would 
be to reconcile top-down “direction” with the often  ill-directed 
and bottom-up nature of innovation and technological change.
With respect to the Ponzi scheme potential, the key issue is 
the scope for deception: a misrepresentation of the viability of 
current living standards (case 3) or of the level of investment 
needed, or allocated, to ensure weak or strong sustainability. 
This in turn raises questions concerning incentives to decep-
tion and the structures that can prevent it. 
5. THE NaTURE  
OF TECHNOLOGICaL CHaNGE
To avoid being “our own Ponzis”, it is vital that the structure 
of incentives should point towards sustainable development. 
Substitution of natural with man-made capital will not neces-
sarily secure sustainability, even in its weak form. Everything 
depends on the character and use of the man-made capital, 
and speciically the nature of technological change. If insufi-
cient attention is given to the wider impacts, the result can be 
economic ineficiency and ultimate unsustainability.
The history of industrial development following World War 
II illustrates the dangers of unsustainability and the conse-
quent need for remedial action to return development to a 
sustainable path. The 1972 United Nations Conference on 
the Human Environment (UN, 1972) noted “man’s capability 
to… enhance the quality of life”, but also to do “incalculable 
harm to human beings and the human environment”, and 
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drew attention to “dangerous levels of pollution in water, air, 
earth and living beings; major and undesirable disturbances 
to the ecological balance of the biosphere; destruction and 
depletion of irreplaceable resources; and gross deiciencies, 
harmful to the physical, mental and social health of man, in 
the man-made environment, particularly in the living and 
working environment”, leading to “a point… in history when 
we must shape our actions throughout the world with a more 
prudent care for their environmental consequences”. This UN 
Conference can be seen as a turning point, prompting aware-
ness of the unsustainability of the development path followed 
in the nineteen ifties and sixties, and of the consequent need 
to remedy the backlog of environmental neglect. This think-
ing inluenced the development of policy initiatives, such as 
– for instance – the European Community’s irst environmen-
tal action programme, inaugurated in 1973 (see European 
Community, 1973).
The effect of malign incentives is well illustrated by the his-
tory of the EU Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). The main 
objectives of the CAP, speciied in the 1957 EEC Treaty, were 
to increase agricultural productivity and ensure security of 
supply. Price supports gave incentives for increasing produc-
tion, and agricultural development was principally geared to 
raising output. The consequence was to generate agricultural 
surpluses through intensive farming, with serious conse-
quences for the environment from over-use of fertilisers and 
pesticides. Re-orientation of incentives to promote more en-
vironmentally friendly technologies and farming techniques 
proved a tortuous process: initially various environmentally 
related incentive mechanisms were added on piecemeal, 
greatly complicating the policy without clear gains for the en-
vironment (for further details of this phase of the CAP, see 
Barrass & Madhavan, 1996, pp.264-65).
6. TIME FRaMES aND TIME INCONSISTENCY
If unsustainable development is indeed a Ponzi scheme, 
its scope is wider and its timescale longer than that of 
the conventional fraudulent scheme. The environmental 
 medium-term can stretch over decades, as the consequen-
ces of  neglect take time to become manifest. The long-term 
is deined in terms of generations. The differences in time 
frame can be represented as follows: 
Conventional Ponzi scheme: early participants’ “returns” are 
inanced by payments received from subsequent participants, 
rather than yields on investments, so that the scheme ulti-
mately collapses leaving investors with little or nothing.
Environmental Medium-term: industrial development is 
under taken without regard to environmental protection, 
leaving a legacy of environmental damage (and hence 
 remedial costs), such that subsequent industrialisation is 
severely constrained in its use of the diminished absorptive 
capacity of the environment. 
Environmental Long-term: potential inter-generational im-
pacts are especially problematical, because of the long time 
scales and because the victims (or beneiciaries) are as yet 
unborn, and therefore unable directly to inluence present 
day decisions. 
The argument that present day economic activity is defrauding 
the future has been eloquently put by Joe Romm: “we created 
a way of raising standards of living that we can’t possibly pass 
on to our children, We have been getting rich by depleting all 
our natural stocks — water, hydrocarbons, forests, rivers, ish 
and arable land — and not by generating renewable lows” 
(Friedman, 2009).
The differences and similarities are summarised in table 1.
Conventional Ponzi Environmental 
 Medium-term 
Environmental 
Long-term  
[intergenerational]
Victims volunteer Victims denied 
 opportunity
Victims not yet born
Terms for participa-
tion appear favourable
Terms for participa-
tion are unfavourable
Victims have no 
choices 
High rates of return Returns inlated by 
lack of provision for 
damage costs
Positive discount 
rates
Recovery more 
time-dependent than 
asset-dependent 
( investors make 
 money if they 
withdraw before the 
collapse).
Recovery both asset- 
and time-dependent 
(impacts depend on 
the intensity of dam-
aging activities and 
timing of remedial 
actions).
Recovery more 
asset-dependent 
than time-dependent 
(impacts depend on 
technology and the 
nature, not the timing, 
of investment).
Explicit fraud on 
indentiiable victims
Degree of “fraud” 
depends on the 
 transparency and 
 effectiveness of 
 protection measures
Intention not explicit; 
victims unknowable
Long timescales can give rise to time inconsistency: para-
meters within the decision framework are not  necessarily 
ixed for all time. One example might be where a carbon 
tax  succeeds in inducing investment in low carbon techno-
logy, and the government can then reduce the carbon tax 
to achieve other objectives. The consequence can either be 
that those subject to the tax perceive deception on the part 
of the  authorities, or that anticipation of the relaxation of the 
tax prevents it from having the desired incentive effect (see 
Helm et al., 2004).
More generally, the values of future generations are unlikely 
to be the same as those prevailing today, and valuations and 
trade-offs may be very different. The choices that are faced in 
the future, and their relative attraction, are an – uncertain – 
function of decisions that are made in the present. In a weak 
sustainability scenario economic growth is supposed to pro-
vide resources for future generations to protect the quality of 
Table 1: Comparison of Ponzi schemes and environmental degradation.
6Madhavan et al Unsustainable Development: Could it be a Ponzi Scheme?
Madhavan et al | P6
their environment. However, the qualitative nature of growth, 
and the sort of technologies that are generated, sets the 
 context for future choices. Without some quality assurance, 
there may a perception of a potential Ponzi scheme.
7. DISCOUNTING aND  
INTER-GENERaTIONaL EFFECTS
A pervasive problem in sustainable development is a mult-
iplicity of timescales. Time horizons range from the politi-
cal to the geological. The former was encapsulated in the 
famous remark by a British Prime minister that “a week 
is a long time in politics”. In geological time the length of 
a human lifespan, and indeed of the existence of humanity 
itself, is negligible. Change over geological time, although 
profound, would be of little signiicance for humans if it were 
gradual and continuous; however, discontinuities that bring 
about catastrophic change are potentially an immense threat 
with incalculable consequences.
The evidence of biology might suggest that nature favours 
short time horizons: thus “evolution’s favoring of organisms 
that respond to local or near-term events results in a steep… 
discount rate for distant… events (Paulos,1996, p.96). On the 
other hand sustainability implies an ethical position such as 
the Rawlsian just saving principle, whereby each generation 
altruistically cares for its successor, such that a generation’s 
well-being “depends not only on its own consumption level, 
but also on its descendents’ consumption levels” (Dasgupta, 
2005, p.9). 
The inter-generational impacts of a development path only 
become apparent beyond any decision-making time horizon 
deined with reference to conventional economic criteria. In 
economic analysis the time horizon is conceived in two ways. 
For practical purposes it is implicit in the use of a discount 
rate that deines relative valuations of distant and near events; 
if a cost or beneit is suficiently far into the future, discount-
ing will render its present value negligible. The horizon can 
also be set with reference to the short run, in which there is 
only limited scope for adjustment; this is distinguished from 
the long run, in which all factors are variable, and in which, as 
J M Keynes memorably remarked, “we are all dead”. 
In order to ensure that the possibilities of unsustainability are 
not obscured, it is necessary to think beyond the time hori-
zon. In which case it is necessary to consider the basis for 
discounting future costs and beneits in the very long term: 
and unfortunately “the biggest uncertainty of all… is the un-
certainty about which interest rate to use for discounting” 
(Weitzman, 2007, p.705). Positive discount rates are normally 
justiied on the basis of future economic growth (so that the 
marginal utility of future consumption is less than that of 
present consumption) and a pure time preference for enjoy-
ment earlier rather than later. The latter implies a question: 
whose preferences? It makes sense for an individual (or group 
of individuals) making judgements about the timing of their 
own consumption now and in the future, but its ethical basis is 
dubious in inter-generational welfare comparisons. This issue 
is faced in the Stern Report to the UK government on climate 
change, which states that “a future generation… has the same 
claim on our ethical attention as the current one” (Stern, 2006, 
p.31). In other words there must be inter-generational equity. 
One possible inference is that, if we do not give equal weight 
to the interests of future generations, we become the moral 
equivalent of Ponzi fraudsters, who most certainly put their 
own interests ahead of those of their victims. 
On the other hand, there is no obligation to give priority to 
future generations over the interests of the existing popula-
tion. Dasgupta (2005, p.15) shows that the optimum inter-
generational allocation of consumption should relect both 
the concern for inter-generational equity in consumption and 
the rate of discount for future well-being. So it is legitimate to 
make allowance for the beneit that will derive from economic 
growth, indeed it would be economically ineficient not to do 
so: but this raises questions as to what is a reasonable es-
timate of uncertain future growth, and (more fundamentally) 
what is a reasonable procedure for making the estimate in a 
way that avoids a bias in favour of the short-term. 
One reason for very high (implicit) discount rates, with no 
thought to future generations, is immediate threats to sur-
vival. Such is the situation of those who are “desperately 
poor and think only of food for the next day” (Diamond, 2005, 
p.434). Even otherwise, the often criticised short-term focus 
of the stock markets, favouring investment with a short pay-
back period, implies high discount rates. There is evidently a 
dissonance between the immediate considerations driving a 
preoccupation with the short-term, and the low discount rates 
required to meet concerns for inter-generational equity.
8. RaTIONaLITY
The perpetrators of a Ponzi scheme are acting rationally, 
 albeit unethically and illegally, insofar as the short term 
 beneit to themselves of their deception outweighs the even-
tual penalties and opprobrium visited upon them when the 
scheme  collapses. By the same token a disregard for  future 
generations can be rational. For instance, a high rate of 
time preference implies a premise that the interests of the 
 present generation should have priority; on this basis unsus-
tainability is rational, if ethically questionable. Furthermore 
 extreme  unsustainability can be self-fulilling: if the worst 
case –  human extinction – is already unavoidable, a high rate 
of time preference would clearly be rational.
It is a sobering thought that behaviour that is, in economic 
terms, rational can lead to extinction. With a suficiently high, 
and constant, discount rate a stream of utility lasting for a 
 inite time can have a higher present value than a lower  utility 
stream of ininite duration; for example, if the discount rate is 
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5 percent per year, $131 per year for 30 years would have a 
higher present value than $100 per year forever (for a formal 
proof of this proposition see Neumayer, 1999, pp.212-13). This 
means that “we” acting as “our own Ponzis” (Paulos,1996, 
p.96), and following the rules of economic rationality, would 
be in a position analogous to investors who cash in their 
 excessive returns before the scheme collapses.
Self-deception, in contrast, is not rational. It is confused, and 
manifested in apparent inconsistency in the ranking of prefe-
rences and between short and long-term preferences. Indi-
viduals can have multiple, and inconsistent, preferences: for 
example consumers of unhealthy junk food may neverthe-
less acknowledge that their optimal choice would be healthy 
 organic food (see George, 2001, p.25). Similarly, “the best way 
to understand how we could be rational in our perception of 
the risks and probabilities and, at the same time, be foolish 
in acting on them, would be to have a conversation with a 
 cigarette smoker” (Taleb, 2004, p.215).
Ponzi schemes typically thrive in a chaotic mixture of decep-
tion and self-deception. This was exempliied in the febrile 
atmosphere leading up to the 2008 crisis in global banking. 
Securitisation of mortgage payments (including those on low-
quality sub-prime mortgages) resulted in extremely complex 
inancial instruments which, notwithstanding the sub-prime 
element, were given highest, triple A, rating. Accurate as-
sessments of the risks was extremely dificult, so “investors 
 relied on the ratings agencies to guide them… which seemed a 
 rational easy solution to contending with the complexity” (Tett, 
2009, p.117).  Unfortunately the agencies were beset by con-
licts of interest between their duties to investors who bought 
securities and to the banks who sold them, and who were 
the agencies’ paymasters. Thus “banks constantly threatened 
to boycott the [ratings] agencies if they failed to produce the 
wished for ratings, jeopardising the sizeable fees the agencies 
earned from the banks” (Tett, 2009, p.119).
Societal responses to environmental pressures exhibit 
similar confusions. Jared Diamond draws attention to the 
 inluence of institutions (political, economic and social) and 
 cultural  values (Diamond, 2005, pp.14-15), which can result 
in a  mixture of rational bad behaviour, disastrous values, 
 unsuccessful  solutions (Diamond, 2005, pp.427-37). 
Possible failings include a lack of:
•	Anticipation Problems are unprecedented, or the prec-
edents are forgotten, or are misperceived because false 
analogies are drawn. Example: the introduction of alien 
species in Australia, which “with the beneits of hindsight 
we now view as incredibly stupid” (Diamond, 2005, p.421).
•	Perception Problems develop invisibly, perhaps as 
a long-term trend with short term luctuations: cli-
mate change is a prominent example (Diamond, 2005, 
pp. 424-25).
•	A	will	to	address	problems What is rational for segments 
of society is not necessarily rational from the viewpoint 
of the long-term interest of society as a whole. For 
 instance logging companies can make a Ponzi-style 
proit from deforestation, but at the expense of biodi-
versity and indigenous populations reliant on forest 
 products ( Diamond, 2005, p.421).
9. UNCERTaINTY aND SUSPICION
Uncertain conditions and an uncertain future generate scope 
for deception and – especially – for self-deception. The in-
teraction over time between human activity and the natural 
environment amounts to an extremely – almost inconceivably 
– complex system.
The state of uncertainty is normally deined as one in which 
it is not possible to attach a probability to known outcomes. 
A situation in which the nature of the outcomes is also un-
known can be characterised as a state of ignorance (see EEA, 
2001, p.192). However, in an uncertain world the concept of 
a “known” probability has an element of contradiction: for 
 example, there can be much less conidence in the estimat-
ed probabilities of global temperature increases than in the 
 probability of a coin toss coming out “heads” (conlation of 
these notions of probability is characterised by Taleb (2007, 
p.125) as the “ludic fallacy”). It is also conceivable that ideas 
of the probability of an outcome are irmer than the under-
standing of the nature of this outcome, a situation that can be 
characterised as chaotic suspicion. 
Uncertainty, ignorance and suspicion are a relection of the 
complexity of the human life support system. In the face of a 
complex reality simpliication is a legitimate analytical device, 
but the limits of knowledge should be acknowledged. Decep-
tion arises when reassurance is sought, or offered, through 
false knowledge, involving a misrepresentation – conscious or 
otherwise – of the underlying realities.
One way to avoid thinking about complexity is through inertia, 
with uncritical extrapolation from the past to the future. This 
is indeed what Ponzi scheme promoters encourage in their 
victims: a complacent belief that implausibly high returns 
 apparently delivered in the past will continue in the future. 
To assume the continuation of present trends – business as 
usual – is to run the risk that development will proceed onto 
an unsustainable path, perhaps becoming destabilised by 
 climate change, or conlicts over water resources, or pres-
sures on land use. This failure of anticipation is a criticism 
that can be made of Lomborg’s sceptical environmentalism, 
which attacks “litanists” who – allegedly – see all round de-
terioration in environmental quality (Lomborg, 2001). In fact, 
environmentalists claim credit for improvements, such as 
better atmospheric quality due to pollution control measures 
and cleaner production techniques (see Barrass, 2003).
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Past success stories are in the past: the challenge is to be 
prepared for future eventualities. This proposition can be 
 illustrated in the history of European environmental pol-
icy. The irst European Community environmental action 
 programme (European Community, 1973) was concerned to 
remedy an  inheritance of previous environmental neglect, 
particularly with reference to air and water quality; there 
was no mention of issues that subsequently became promi-
nent on the environmental policy agenda, such as climate 
change, nuclear waste management, ozone layer depletion 
and soil degradation.
Anticipation, and the lack of it, are of course much evident in 
hindsight. Looking forward, beset by uncertainty, deception 
can be perceived in the (contradictory) forms both of alarm-
ism and complacency. Past experience suggests that hitherto 
unanticipated issues will in the future rise to prominence on 
the environmental agenda.
10. ISSUES
An analogy between unsustainable development and a Ponzi 
scheme prompts questions as to the identity of the Ponzis and 
of their victims. On one level the answer is quite simple: any-
one whose activities are damaging and who fails to offset, or 
compensate for, the damage caused is complicit in Ponzi-like 
behaviour; and anyone who suffers as a result of that damage 
is a victim. However, if Ponzi-ism is viewed in terms of motiva-
tions and consciousness the issues are quite complex.
The perpetrators of Ponzi schemes do not necessarily set 
out to defraud. A momentum can develop in which fraudu-
lent behaviour is the only way to keep the scheme going; and 
the fraudster may be in denial over what outsiders eventually 
see with hindsight as the inevitability of its collapse. This is, 
for  instance, one possible explanation for the behaviour of 
Bernard Madoff, famous for running a $50bn Ponzi scheme 
(Sander, 2009, p.206).
Similarly, no rational individuals or society deliberately set 
out on an unsustainable development path. Yet, as Jared 
 Diamond points out, societal collapse is a historical phenom-
enon. The reasons for this are mixed: dogma,  inlexibility, 
ignorance. Perhaps most fundamental is unawareness of 
the possibility of collapse: a society in denial cannot avert 
disaster. Humans are aware of their own mortality, but for 
the most part choose not to think about it. At a societal level 
there is even less willingness to contemplate demise: the im-
plicit  assumption, in the post-Enlightenment world, is usually 
 optimistic – at least until confronted by unassailable evidence 
of looming danger.
So the Ponzi-ism associated with unsustainability is most likely 
to be inadvertent, the result of reckless rather than deliberate 
behaviour: economic development without thought to the con-
sequences. The victims’ inability to gain redress may be a result 
of powerlessness, of diffusion of the damage (such that people 
can be simultaneously a Ponzi and a victim), or (in the case of 
inter-generational effects) of non-existence in the present.
Equity and economic eficiency are the twin pillars of sustain-
able development. A failure to take proper account of all the 
costs of economic activity, both now and in the future, is in-
eficient. The weightings given to future costs (and beneits) 
should be equitable between generations. Thus the key to 
awareness is a better understanding of our development path: 
and a precondition for this is a conscious will to achieve this 
understanding. This will diminish the scope for Ponzi-ism 
by default.
There are certain speciic steps that will deter Ponzi-ism. 
One is an assertion of societal property rights, so that there 
is a clear interest in avoidance of victimhood. Another step 
is to make more explicit the nature of trusteeship, and the 
 responsibility for safeguarding the interests of potential 
 victims.  Economic incentives should be consistent with 
 sustainability: so it is necessary to reconcile a natural ten-
dency of organisations and individuals, to focus on narrowly 
deined and short-term advantage with society’s wider and 
long-term interests. Above all it is vital to guard against 
complacency: to be prepared for the unexpected, and to 
 attempt to come closer to imagining the unimaginable.
The key question remains one of institutional  capacity to 
 determine the course of development, and to ensure its 
 sustainability. To “keep us from being our own Ponzis” 
 Paulos (1996, p.96) recommends “a Global Reserve Board to 
help decide on more rational discount rates”; but is not clear 
how this could work within a market economy. Clearly, to 
avoid unsustainability the incentives facing individuals and 
organisations should favour actions consistent with sustain-
able development. Sustainability requires that investment 
should ensure that there is adequate substitution for the 
 natural capital stock. The debate on climate change mea-
sures has highlighted the issues surrounding the discount 
rate for ultra long-term impacts. In the short-term, behav-
iour typically implies a massive discount on any impacts 
 beyond the fairly immediate future. The investment deci-
sions of enterprises are to a great extent driven by the terms 
on which inance can be raised; and the monetary authorities 
use short term interest rates as the instrument of monetary 
policy. If inancing becomes more expensive, businesses 
discount the future more heavily, seeking higher returns on 
marginal investment. In contrast, a sustainable development 
strategy calls for low discount rates for inter-generational 
effects, and for investment and technological change that 
speciically meet the requirements of (at least weak) sus-
tainability. To ensure that market behaviour conforms to this 
strategy would seem to require a conscious reorientation 
of incentives. This would imply that the authorities should 
make investment inancing and iscal measures subject to 
tests of consistency with the strategy.
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11. IN CONCLUSION
Could unsustainable development be a Ponzi scheme? The 
 answer is a qualiied yes. Clearly not in a literal sense,  because 
the concept of a long-term Ponzi scheme is self- contradictory. 
Nevertheless there are similarities, particularly with reference 
to self-deception and denial of inconvenient truths, which is 
perhaps an underestimated element of Ponzi schemes and 
also igures in some perspectives on environmental protection 
and sustainable development. If there is a Ponzi scheme it has 
numerous, albeit unwilling and unwitting, perpetrators, and 
potentially even more  victims; indeed most – perhaps all – the 
perpetrators are themselves liable to be victims. 
The remedy begins with an acknowledgement that there is a 
problem. This can lead to better informed decision-making, 
and the building of consensus on the key issues of equity and 
eficiency. There needs to be a stronger assertion of societal 
property rights: both the rights of society as whole and of indi-
viduals and groups within society. With this would come more 
explicit concepts of trusteeship, to safeguard the interests of 
potential victims. 
These developments should be paralleled by development 
of institutional and societal capacity. This would create a 
framework within which economic incentives are consistent 
with sustainability, reconciling a natural focus on narrowly 
deined and short-term advantage with society’s wider and 
long-term interests.
Development as a dynamic process is always at risk of 
destabilisation, of veering towards unsustainability. The 
 sustainable development agenda thus needs to be subject 
to continuous review, to identify issues as soon as possible. 
If this is not done, complacency can be a powerful force 
for Ponzi-ism by default.
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